ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In Local Area network (LAN), when two hosts want to communicate with each other, they need to know the MAC address of each other. If the communicating host does not know MAC address of the destination, it sends an ARP request to the broadcast domain asking for the MAC address corresponding to the destination host's IP address. The destination host identifies that the ARP request is meant for its IP address and hence, sends back its MAC address in a unicast ARP reply packet. Most of the LAN based attacks are launched by sending falsified IP-MAC pairs to the host being targeted. The victim machine assumes the MAC address in the forged ARP packet as the genuine MAC address associated with the IP. Now when the victim machine wants to communicate with the system having the given IP, it sends all packets to the false MAC address (i.e., to a different host the attacker wants the victim to send). Attacks based on falsified IP-MAC pairs are feasible because host updates its ARP cache without verifying the genuineness of the IP-MAC pair of the source [1] . Also, the hosts cache all the ARP replies sent to them even if they had not sent an explicit ARP request for them. In other words, ARP spoofing is possible because of the stateless nature of the ARP. Various mechanisms have been proposed to detect and mitigate these ARP attacks at both the host-level and network-level. In [2] , a literature review on network based IDS for detecting ARP spoofing attacks with their drawbacks have been discussed. The authors also present a new network based IDS to detect such spoofing attacks and highlights how many of the drawbacks are eliminated. The present paper is focused towards development of a host based IDS for ARP spoofing based attacks. So, all discussions regarding existing techniques for ARP attack detection are confined to host-based ones; the techniques can be broadly classified as follows.
Static ARP [3]
ARP related attacks can be avoided completely by manually as-signing static IP addresses to all the systems in the network [3] . The ARP cache of the host has the static mapping of IP-MAC pairings of all other hosts inside the net-work. Since these entries are immutable, any spoofed packets will be blindly ignored by the kernel. However, this solution is not applicable to large networks because of the problem of scalability and management especially in a dynamic environment.
Stateful ARP [4, 5]
The technique is based on extending the existing the standard ARP protocol by modifying the ARP cache from a stateless to a stateful one. Here, the host has a state ARP cache which holds the states of the previous requests and verifies the replies with it. Two queues requestedQ and respondedQ are used to store the state information of cache. Now the incoming responses are matched from corresponding requestedQ and enters into responded queue till timeout.
A major problem in the Stateful ARP based approach is that Gratuitous request/reply, is not supported. Moreover, the modification of stateless cache to stateful cache requires the extension of the protocol specification thereby making it more complex. ARP is basically designed to keep the protocol simple and so, modification to standard ARP is not desirable.
Cryptographic Solutions [6, 7]
Another solution is to utilize the cryptographic techniques to prevent the ARP attacks. The limitation of such techniques is that each host has to maintain the public key for every other host in network. Also, all the hosts inside the network must be configured to understand the new protocol which requires the upgradation of the network stacks of all the systems involved. Moreover, lots of processing overhead for the signature generation, verification and key management is involved.
Active techniques for detecting ARP attacks
In active detection based techniques, probe packets are sent across the network to get the information of the suspected host for which the IP-MAC pair has been changed. Several active techniques for detecting ARP attacks have been reported; they are briefly discussed below.
In [13] , a database of known IP-MAC pairs is maintained and on detection of a change the new pair is actively verified by sending a TCP SYN packet as the probe. Also, any new pair of IP-MAC is first verified by the probing technique before entering it in the database. On receiving the probe, the genuine system will respond with SYN/ACK or RST depending upon whether the port is open or not. This scheme is able to detect ARP spoofing attacks but it violates the network layering architecture.
Another means to confirm the authenticity of the receiving ARP response packet is by crafting a RARP request packet [14] , which seeks the IP address corresponding to the given MAC address. By comparing the IP addresses of the responses, MAC cloning might be detected. However, a single MAC address may genuinely correspond to a number of IP addresses, in which case, a lot of false positives could be generated. In a similar scheme proposed in [15] , ARP probe packets (instead of RARP request packet) are used for IP-MAC validation of the source host from which an ARP packet is received. Unicast ARP probe packets are sent to the host (identified by the MAC) for verification. If a mismatch occurs in the IP addresses of the probe reply compared to the ARP packet being verified, spoofing is notified. The scheme follows the network layering concepts but fails if the attacker is spoofing some IP with its own MAC address. This is because the unicast ARP probe generated by the IDS will go only to the attacker (identified by the MAC) and it would reply back with the same spoofed IP associated with its MAC.
Hence, from the review it may be stated that an ARP attack prevention/detection scheme needs to have the following features -Should not modify the standard ARP or violate layering architecture of network -Should generate minimal extra traffic in the network -Should detect a large set of LAN based attacks -Hardware cost of the scheme should not be high
In this paper, we propose an active host based IDS (HIDS) to detect a large set of ARP related attacks namely, malformed packets, response spoofing, request spoofing and denial of service. This technique does not require changes in the standard ARP and does not violate the principles of layering structure. Finally, we present a proof of completeness and correctness of the proposed scheme.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the proposed approach. In Section 3 we discuss the test bed and experimental results. In Section 4 we prove the correctness of the proposed approach. Finally we conclude in Section 5.
PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we discuss the proposed host-based active intrusion detection scheme for ARP related attacks. The following assumption is made regarding the LAN -Non-compromised (i.e., genuine) hosts will send a response to an ARP request within a specific interval T req .
Data Tables for the Scheme
The proposed IDS running in a host ensures the genuineness of the IP-MAC pairing (of any ARP packet it receives) by an active verification mechanism. The IDS sends verification messages termed as probe requests upon receiving ARP requests and ARP replies. To assist in the probing and separating the genuine IP-MAC pairs with that of spoofed ones, we maintain some information obtained along with the probe requests, ARP requests and ARP replies in some data tables. The information and the data tables used are enumerated below. 
Algorithms of the IDS
The proposed HIDS algorithm has two main modules namely, ARP REQUEST-HANDLER() and ARP RESPONSE-HANDLER() to handle incoming and outgoing ARP packets respectively. The modules are discussed below:
Algorithm 1 processes all the ARP request packets received by the host. For any ARP request packet RQP received, the HIDS first checks if it is malformed (i.e., is there any change in the immutable fields of the ARP packer header or different MAC addresses in the MAC and ARP header field) or unicast; if so, a status flag is set accordingly and stops further processing of this packet.
The HIDS next finds whether the packet received is a Gratuitous ARP request and the status flag is set accordingly. If none of the above cases holds, the reply packet is then matched for a corresponding request in the Request-sent [ j] ) the packet may be spoofed with a wrong MAC address and hence the status flag is set as spoofed. If the RSP IPS is not present in the Authenticated bindings table, then an ARP probe is sent for verification by the VERIFY IP-MAC() module. If there was no corresponding request for the response packet in the Request-sent table, then it is an unsolicited response packet. Hence, the UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER() is called with the time at which such a response is received τ.
Algorithm 2: ARP RESPONSE HANDLER
Input: RSP -ARP response packet, t -time at which RSP was received, Request-sent VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP, τ) 8:
EXIT 11: The main modules discussed in Algorithms1 and Algorithm 2 are assisted by three sub-modules namely, VERIFY IP-MAC(), SPOOF-DETECTOR() and UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER(). Now, we discuss these sub-modules in detail.
VERIFY IP-MAC() (Algorithm 3) sends ARP probes to verify the correctness of the IP-MAC pair given in the source of the request packet RQP or response packet RSP. Every time a probe is sent, its record is inserted in Verification 
SPOOF-DETECTOR() (Algorithm 4) is called from VERIFY IP-MAC() after sending the ARP
Probe Request to source IP of the packet to be checked for spoofing (RP IPS ). As discussed, it is assumed that all replies to the ARP probe will be sent within T req time. So, SPOOF-DETECTOR() waits for T req interval of time, thereby collecting all probe responses in the Response-received table. As it is assumed that non-comprised hosts will always respond to a probe, at least one response to the probe will arrive. In other words, in one of the replies to the probe, genuine MAC for the IP RP IPS would be present. If a spoofing attempt is determined the status is returned as spoofed and it is exited. If the packet is found genuine, Authenticated bindings table is updated with its source IP (RP IPS ) and the corresponding MAC.
Algorithm 4: SPOOF-DETECTOR
Input: RP-ARP request/reply packet, T req -Time required for arrival of all responses to an ARP probe (ARP request-reply round trip time), Response-received UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER() (Algorithm 5) is invoked whenever an unsolicited ARP reply packet is received (i.e., ARP reply packet did not find a matching ARP request in the Request-sent table) and is used for detection of denial of service (DoS) attacks. In general, ARP replies are received corresponding to the ARP requests. If more than a certain number of unsolicited responses are are sent to a host within a time window, it implies an attempt of DoS attack on the given host. Algorithm 5 maintains an "Unsolicited response counter (denoted as URSP counter ) for storing the number of unsolicited responses received by the host within a specified time interval (δ) and declares DoS attack if the number of unsolicited ARP replies within a time interval (δ) exceeds a preset threshold DoS Th .
Algorithm 5: UNSOLICITED-RESPONSE-HANDLER
Input: τ -Time when RSP is received, δ-Time window, DoS Th -DoS Threshold, Un-solicited response table Output: Status 1: if (τ −URSP τ < δ ) then 2: URSP counter ++ 3: URSP τ =τ 4: if (URSPT counter > DoS Th ) then 5: Status=DoS 6: EXIT 7: end if 8: else 9: URSP counter =1 10: URSP τ =τ 11: end if
An Example
In this sub-section we illustrate ARP response verification in normal and spoofed cases. Consider a network with four hosts -A, B, C, D and host D is the attacker. HIDS be installed on all the hosts which need to be secure. 
EXPERIMENTATION
The test bed created for our experiments consists of 5 machines running different operating systems. We name the machines with alphabets ranging from A-D. The tables mentioned above are created in mysql database. The algorithms are implemented using C language. The HIDS has two major modules namely, Packet grabber and Packet injector. Packet grabber sniffs the packets from the host's network interface card (NIC), filters the ARP packets and invokes either the Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 depending upon the packet type -request or response. The Packet injector module generates the ARP probes necessary for the verification of IP-MAC pairs. Attack generation tools Ettercap, Cain and Abel were deployed in machine D and several scenarios of spoofing MAC addresses were attempted. In our experiments we tested our proposed scheme with several variants of LAN attack scenarios (including the one discussed in the example above). Table 5 presents the types of LAN attacks generated and detected successfully by the proposed scheme. Also, in the table we report the capabilities of other LAN attack detecting tools for these attacks. Figure 2 shows the amount of ARP traffic generated in the experimentation in 4 cases. The first case is of normal operation in the absence of the IDS. Second case is when the IDS is running and there are no attacks generated in the network. Third case is when we injected 100 spoofed IP-MAC pairs into the LAN and IDS is not running. Fourth case is when we injected 100 spoofed IP-MAC pairs into the LAN with IDS running. We notice almost same amount of ARP traffic under normal situation with and without IDS running. Once genuine IP-MAC pairs are identified (by probing) they are stored in Authenticated bindings table. Following that no probes are required to be sent for any ARP request/reply from these IP-MAC pairs. In case of attack, a little extra traffic is generated by our IDS for the probes. With each spoofed ARP packet, our IDS sends a probe request and expects at least two replies (one from normal and the other from the attacker), there by adding only three ARP packets for each spoofed packet.
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ANALYSIS OF COMPLETENESS AND CORRECTNESS
In this section we prove the completeness of the algorithm IDS using different scenarios of ARP spoofing attacks. In this paper, hosts are identified by alphabets, a for example, and IP (MAC) address of the host is represented by IP(a) (MAC(a)). Before the proof, certain definitions are given.
ARP spoofing attack
In ARP spoofing attack a malicious host m sends an ARP request/response packet to another host p in the LAN with falsified IP-MAC pair. In the response/request packet being sent, IP 
Victim Machine
A machine in the LAN whose network traffic can be redirected to some other machine is called the victim machine. In Definition 4, host v is the victim machine as traffic being sent by p to v is redirected to k. We assume the following in our arguments.
An interesting case occurs if
-The set of IP addresses in the LAN corresponding to which the hosts are up is I. -The set of IP addresses in the LAN corresponding to which the hosts are down is I ′ .
We will study completeness of the IDS in two scenarios of the LAN. In the first case let all the machines in the LAN are up and running. In the second case, there may be some machines which are down. In this case, we will also see the situation when such machines are powered up after an attack is launched against them.
Theorem 1
The IDS detects all ARP spoofing attacks except the case where attacker becomes the victim, when all IP address in I are used.
Proof. We prove the theorem by enumerating all possible combinations of IP-MAC pairs generated by malicious host. Let there be a single malicious host m in the LAN having IP-MAC pair IP(m)-MAC(m); later we will show that the theorem holds for multiple malicious hosts also. It is assumed that Authenticated and Spoofed tables are empty.
There are 5 cases for IP-MAC combinations that can be generated by m-(A) IP(m)-MAC(m), (B) IP(v)-MAC(v) (IP(v) ∈ I ≠ IP(m)), (C) IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I ≠ IP(m)), (D) IP(m)-MAC(v) (v≠ m), (E) IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I, v ≠ k and v;k ≠ m).
Now these cases are analyzed one by one. (A), (B) do not correspond to spoofed cases. The rest are analyzed as follows. The analysis is shown when the malicious host uses a request packet for sending the falsified IP-MAC pair. Same argument will hold when the malicious host uses a response packet for sending the falsified IP-MAC pair.
Case 1-IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I≠ IP(m))
If ARP request packet with IP(v)-MAC(m) is sent by m to the host, then REQUEST-HANDLER() generates a RQP event. As Authenticated and Spoofed tables are empty, probe request is sent by IDS for verification and PRQP event is generated. As the probe request is broadcast it is received by all hosts. So this probe request is also received by the malicious host m and may respond in the ways enumerated below. However, in all cases the genuine host will reply to the probe using an ARP response packet having source IP-MAC pair as IP(v)-MAC(v); for this the RESPONSE-HANDLER() generates a PRSP event, whose MAC address is not same as that of MAC address of the request being verified. (c) The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found false as source IP and destination IP's are not same. Then it will com-pare the IP(v)-MAC(v) pair with that of IDS, but no match will be found. Then it will check request sent table for a match with IP(v), will not find a match. Next on comparison with authentication binding table, also no match will be found (assuming it was not verified earlier). This will result in calling of VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) which then will verify if IP(v) is in verification table. Since it will not find any match, a probe will be sent to IP(v)and record IP(v), MAC(v) in verification table and call the SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP,τ). The SPOOF-DETECTOR will wait for T req time interval and then verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP, will find a match, compare the MAC(v), will find a mismatch for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into the declaration of the packet be Spoofed and hence the status flag will be set as Spoofed.
Variations of Responses of m
So IP(v)-MAC(m) is
correctly identified to be spoofed. Now, let m respond before v. In this situation, sequence of events received is by the IDS is-RQP,PRQP,PRSP,PRSP, where the MAC address of first PRSP is same as the MAC address of the request being verified and the MAC address of second PRSP is different.
The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found false as source IP and destination IP's are not same. Then it will com-pare the IP(v)-MAC(v) pair with that of IDS, but no match will be found. Then it will check request sent table for a match with IP(v), will not find a match. Next on comparison with authentication binding table, also no match will be found (assuming it was not verified earlier). This will result in calling of VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) which then will verify if IP(v) is in verification table. Since it will not find any match, a probe will be sent to IP(v)and record IP(v), MAC(v) in verification table and call the SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP,τ). The SPOOF-DETECTOR will wait for T req time interval and then verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP, will find a match, compare the MAC(v), will find a match for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into the declaration of the packet be Genuine but as soon as the second PRSP from v will arrive and the algorithm will execute in the same fashion but a mismatch will be detected in this step and Spoofing will be detected and hence the status flag will be set as Spoofed.
So IP(v)-MAC(m) is correctly identified to be spoofed.
Case 2-IP(m)-MAC(v) (v ≠ m)
REQUEST So, in all, the following sequence of events is received by the IDS -RQP,PRQP,PRSP; the MAC address of PRSP is same as that of MAC address of the request being verified.
The RESPONSE-HANDLER() will check for gratuitous packet which will be found false as source IP and destination IP's are not same. Then it will com-pare the IP(v)-MAC(v) pair with that of IDS, but no match will be found. Then it will check request sent table for a match with IP(v), will not find a match. Next on comparison with authentication binding table, also no match will be found (assuming it was not verified earlier). This will result in calling of VERIFY IP-MAC(RSP,τ) which then will verify if IP(v) is in verification table.
Since it will not find any match, a probe will be sent to IP(v)and record IP(v), MAC(v) in verification table and call the SPOOF-DETECTOR(RP, τ). The SPOOF-DETECTOR will wait for T req time interval and then verify IP(v) with IP of PRSP, will find a match, compare the MAC(v), will find a match for the corresponding MAC address, resulting into the declaration of the packet be Genuine.
So IP(m)-MAC(v) is incorrectly identified to be genuine.
It may be noted that if response to the probe has same MAC address as that of the request being verified, it is determined to be genuine. In other words, if no response to the probe has different MAC address compared to the request being verified, it is determined to be genuine. From the theorem the following corollary follows.
Case 3-IP(v)-MAC(k)
(
Corollary 1
If all responses to the probe sent by IDS for verifying any request/response packet has same MAC address as that of the packet being verified, the IDS determines normal condition. If at least one response to the probe sent by IDS for verifying any request/response packet has different MAC address compared to the packet being verified, then IDS determines spoofed condition.
Proof. Follows from construction of IDS and illustrated in Theorem 1.
In the next theorem we will show that Theorem 1 also holds when there is more than one malicious host. Before that Theorem 1 is restated as follows: Address associated with IP(v). As v∉ M, IP(v) ∈ (i.e., v is up) and malicious hosts cannot stop v from responding, it will reply with IP(v)-MAC(v). Along with the reply from v, other malicious hosts can also reply to the probe request, however, cannot stop detection of spoofing because reply sent by v has different (correct) MAC address com-pared to the packet being verified (which has spoofed MAC address).
Theorem 2
Let the set of malicious hosts in a LAN be M. Let IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v)
Next we will study completeness of the IDS in the second scenario where some IPs in LAN may not be used, i.e., some of the machines are down. In this case we will also see the situation when such machines are powered up.
Theorem 3
The The rest of the cases ((E),(H)) are analyzed as follows. As in Theorem 1 the analysis is shown when the malicious host uses a request packet for sending the falsified IP-MAC pair. Same argument will hold when the malicious host uses a response packet for sending the falsified IP-MAC pair.
Case 1-IP(v)-MAC(m) (IP(v) ∈ I ′ ≠ IP(m))
REQUEST-HANDLER() generates a RQP event on receiving the packet with IP(v)-MAC(m). A probe request is sent by IDS for verification and PRQP event is generated. As machine with IP(v) is not up, there would not be any reply from v with IP(v)-MAC(v) (that has different MAC address than the packet being verified). Also, the malicious host m will send a reply with same MAC address. So, there is a condition when only one response to the probe request is received that has same MAC address as that of the packet being verified. By Corollary 1, IP(v)-MAC(m) is incorrectly identified to be genuine.
Case 2-IP(v)-MAC(k) (IP(v) ∈ I
′ , v ≠ k and v;k ≠ m)
This situation is similar to Case-1 (of Theorem 3) above.
IP (v)-MAC(k) is incorrectly identified to be genuine.
In Theorem 3 we have seen two conditions when a spoofed packet is determined to be genuine. IP address in such spoofed packets corresponds to system(s) which are down. Now we will see the condition when such a system comes up. The following points can be deduced from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 regarding the consequences of the cases when a spoofed request/reply is determined to be genuine (i.e., false negative cases).
Theorem 1
Spoofed IP-MAC pairs for the case "when attacker itself is the victim", is missed to be detected. This does not lead to a serious consequence because no genuine host can be victimized (by diverting its traffic to some other host). So other attacks like man-in-the-middle, denial of service etc. which require diverting traffic sent to genuine hosts (to malicious hosts) cannot be launched.
Theorem 3
Spoofed IP-MAC pairs for cases "(i) when attacker itself is the victim" and "(ii)IP address used in a spoofed packet corresponds to a machine which is down" are missed to be detected. Further, even after the machine comes up, spoofing cannot be detected. Case (ii) may lead to serious consequence as traffic intended to a genuine host would be diverted to malicious host.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an HIDS for detecting some of the LAN specific at-tacks and verified the same under all possible circumstances. The scheme uses an active probing mechanism and does not violate the principles of network layering architecture. This being a software based approach does not require any additional hardware to operate.
At present the scheme can only detect the attacks. In other words, in case of spoofing it can only determine the conflicting IP-MAC pairs without differentiating the spoofed IP-MAC and genuine IP-MAC pair. If to some extent diagnosis capability can be pro-vided in the scheme, some remedial action against the attacker can be taken.
